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THIRD PARTY CONSENT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE
One of the common means of securing evidence to be used against crimi-
nal suspects is the consent search. When the authorities have no warrant,
and have made no arrest, they may ask the person who ultimately becomes
the defendant to consent to a search, thereby "waiving" his constitutional
rights. Some of the most troublesome questions which occur in consent
searches arise when someone other than the defendant consents to a search
of a premises in which incriminating evidence is found.
Limitations upon the consents of third parties must ultimately rest
upon the fourth amendment. But here, as in other areas, the Supreme
Court has formulated only vague and general guidelines. In fact, it has
not spoken at all on many important consent problems. Nonetheless, the
third party consent issue has been considered several times.
Amos v. United States,' decided in 1921, has often been cited for the
proposition that a wife may not consent to a search for evidence to be used
against her husband.' The Court actually held, however, that the consent
was coerced; thus, it was not legally obtained, and many courts have read
this issue as controlling.3
In Chapman v. United States,4 a non-resident landlord, suspecting that
his tenant was operating a still, consented to a search of the leased premises
by the police. The Court held the search unconstitutional, declaring that
a non-resident landlord cannot consent to a search of property in the posses-
sion of a tenant. Though the terms of the lease gave the landlord the right
to enter for various reasons, the Court said:
It is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law . . . subtle
distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving
the body of private property law which, more than almost any other
branch . . . has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely
historical.'
1. 255 U.S. 313 (1920).
2. E.g., Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930); Duncan v. Common-
wealth, 198 Ky. 841, 250 S.W. 101 (1923).
3. E.g., Duncan v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 841, 250 S.W. 101 (1923); see cases
cited notes 16-23 infra.
4. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
5. Id. at 617.
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Many courts had already reached similar conclusions,6 but Chapman
seemed to settle the matter.'
Stoner v. California' extended the Chapman rule to the hotel manager-
guest situation. The state argued that the manager had apparent authority
to allow the search, but the Supreme Court answered, "Our decisions
make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to
be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic
doctrines of 'apparent authority.' "' This quotable language would seem
to eliminate the use of agency doctrines by lower courts to validate a third
party's consent.'"
The Supreme Court decisions seem to give support to the rule which
has long been generally accepted; that is, one who does not have rights
of possession and control in the premises searched cannot validly consent.
Perhaps this will eventually be held explicitly to be a doctrine of consti-
tutional compulsion. However, the language in Chapman and Stoner refer-
ring to property law and agency concepts seems to have had no significant
impact upon lower court decisions." Perhaps the Court is willing to permit
the state and lower federal courts to experiment with third party consent
law, intending later to accept the approach or combination of approaches
which best balances the mandate of the fourth amendment with the needs
of law enforcement.
6. E.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 80 Okla. Crim. 43, 156 P.2d 628 (1945); see Duncan v.
State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So. 2d 840 (1965); People v. Faris, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d
282, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965); People v. Currier, 232 Cal. App. 2d 127, 42 Cal. Rptr.
562 (1965); People v. Frank, 225 Cal. App. 2d 339, 37 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1964); People
v. Bankhead, 27 Ill. 2d 18, 187 N.E.2d 705 (1963); State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189
A.2d 23 (1963). But see State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963).
7. Chapman is perhaps better known for its intimation that no search without a war-
rant is reasonable if a warrant could conveniently have been obtained. United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948), insofar as the latter held that the reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest
depended solely upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant, rather than upon
all the circumstances. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Chapman,
thought that the majority was ignoring Rabinowitz and relying on Trupiano, an interpre-
tation of the majority opinion which may have re-opened the question whether the police
must obtain a warrant if convenient. However, the third party consent cases assume that
Rabinowitz is the law.
8. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
9. Id. at 488. The Supreme Court had earlier decided that a hotel manager's con-
sent is valid once the defendant has abandoned the room. Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960).
10. For a discussion of cases using "authority" language see notes 115-16 infra and
accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966) ; People v. Smith,
63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966).
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I. MATTERS WHICH SHOULD BE ISOLATED FROM THE CONSENT ISSUE
Precisely stated, the problem under consideration is: when does consent
by a third party validate the search for, and seizure of, evidence which
would otherwise be inadmissable because of constitutional limitations? This
statement of the problem assumes that several issues which exist in many
third party consent cases have already been decided in a certain way.
Examples include decisions that the consent was not obtained by coercion,
that the defendant has standing to object, and that the consent was not
given by a co-defendant.
These issues tend to confuse the consent question. For example, if the
consent was obtained by coercion, there has been no actual consent, and
the court need not consider whether a consent given under the circum-
stances would have validated the search. The courts have not always fol-
lowed this approach. Much of the third party consent law has developed
in cases in which the resolution of some other issue obviated the need to
decide the consent question. 2 This does not necessarily mean that if one
of these issues is present in a case involving third party consent, the consent
question should not be considered, only that it need not be considered. For
example, if a defendant does not have standing to object to the introduction
of certain evidence, there is no reason to decide whether the consent which
led to the seizing of that evidence was valid. On the other hand, if it is
held that the consent validated the search and seizure, it makes no differ-
ence whether the defendant has standing. Neither issue must be decided
before the other; the point is that either issue alone, if decided against the
defendant, can obviate discussion of the other. Realistically, if both a
defendant's lack of standing and a valid consent search are present in a
case, a court will certainly mention both; however, the analyses must be
kept separate and the fact that either one could be decisive should be
recognized.
Because so many third party consent cases have involved this problem,
and so many of these decisions have not clearly distinguished the consent
question, these extraneous issues must be considered.
A. Coercion
If the consenter is coerced into giving his permission to search, actual
consent has not been given and the search is invalid."3 Coercion ordinarily
12. E.g., United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963)
(no standing to object); United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (E.D. Ohio 1920)
(invalid search warrant); People v. Lind, 370 Ii1. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938).
13. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). See also United States v. Reckis,
119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709
(1963).
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means that something was obtained by force or threat of force. However,
coercion in third party consent cases usually refers to something less than
force or threats." Though each case is decided on its particular facts,
courts seem to find coercion if the "consent" was obtained under such cir-
cumstances that the consenter could not have made a rational decision.
1 5
Yet there is no question that the consent need not be voluntary in the sense
that the consenter "wants" the search to be made.' Though it is placed
14. Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 443, 138 S.W.2d 956 (1940) (request equiva-
lent to demand under circumstances). Threats of adverse consequences other than force
may be sufficient to require a holding that consent was coerced. Waldron v. United
States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (threat to ransack house when warrant obtained).
15. Frequently, the courts use the term "implied coercion" to describe the situation in
which the manifestation of assent was not voluntarily given, despite the absence of physi-
cal force. E.g., Amos v. United States, 225 U.S. 313 (1921); People v. Lind, 370 Ill.
131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
The unexpected appearance of law enforcement officers may result in an acquiescence's
lacking the "spontaneity and attributes of an invitation," State v. Lindway, supra, at 171,
2 N.E.2d at 493, or the "dignity of a consent," United States v. Linderman, 32 F. Supp.
123, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); see State v. Bonolo, 270 Pac. 1065 (Wyo. 1928). The time
the search is made may be an important factor. See United States v. Roberts, 179 F.
Supp. 478 (D.C. Cir. 1959); People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964); People v. Porter, 227 Cal. 2d 211, 38 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1964);
People v. Palmer, 31 111. 2d 58, 198 N.E.2d 839 (1964); Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368,
196 A.2d 891 (1964). But the fact that the search is made in the middle of the night
does not inevitably mean it will be held unreasonable. E.g., People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d
737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957). Courts should consider the ability of the consenting party to
understand what the officers are doing. United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp. 478
(D.C. Cir. 1959); see People v. Jennings, 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 56 (1956).
Care must be taken not to confuse coerced search cases, such as State v. Manning,
134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965), in which no consent was asked for or given, with coerced
consent cases. Also distinguishable are cases in which a consent to search was held
invalid when given after a coerced entry. People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 388 P.2d
665, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, (1964); People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939);
People v. Boyle, 39 Misc. 2d 917, 242 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Port Jervis City Ct. 1963); Com-
monwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963); see People v. Di Blasi, 228
Cal. App. 2d 338, 39 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1964).
16. Third party consent searches would be almost non-existent if this were required.
The cases would be limited to: (1) situations in which the consenter was ignorant of
the defendant's crime, see Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965), remanded on
other grounds, 384 U.S. 312 (1966); (2) cases in which the third party wished to
dispel suspicion and believed that the evidence would not be found, see United States
v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945); People v. Nelson, 218 Cal. App. 2d 359,
32 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1963); People v. Megliorino, 192 Cal. App. 2d 525, 13 Cal. Rptr.
635 (1961); Joslin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 161, 305 S.W.2d 351 (1957); or (3) the
rare case in which the consenter planted bogus evidence hoping that it would be found
and exculpate the defendant, see Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
The hostility of the consenter to the defendant may result in an invalid consent.
Notes 104-08 infra and accompanying text. When there is no hostility, the consenter's in-
viting the police to the premises is strong evidence of the lack of coercion. See, e.g.,
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in this section of the note for convenience, the problem of coercion is admit-
tedly not neatly classifiable as either separate from, or included in, the
consent issue. It is often nearly impossible to say whether a given search
and seizure has been held violative of the fourth amendment because: (1)
the consent of a coerced person cannot validate a search (which would
seem to approach a true consent rule); (2) because a coerced person does
not "consent"; or (3) because the coercive elements in the case make the
search unreasonable, despite a consent given by a person whose consent
would ordinarily be valid. However, the distinction seems academic because
either rationale results in the exclusion of the evidence.
In California, the basic focus of the consent rule is on the reasonableness
of the police conduct; the question is put primarily in terms of whether
the police reasonably believed that the consenter had authority to allow
a search." This "apparent authority" inquiry is, nevertheless, separated
from the question of coercion, which is an indicator of police misconduct
independent of reasonableness of consent.
B. Standing to Object
A defendant must have standing to object to the admission of uncon-
stitutionally seized evidence to bar the use of that evidence.1" Therefore,
when the defendant does not have standing, a court does not have to con-
sider whether a valid third party consent to the search and seizure was ob-
tained. However, some courts have considered the consent issue in opinions
holding that the defendant had no standing, " and several decisions have
confused the standing and consent issues.2"
Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010
(1966). The same is true when the police arrive uninvited, if the first suggestion of a
search is made by the consenter. United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.
1937).
17. Notes 117-33 infra and accompanying text.
18. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). For a complete discussion of
the standing rules see Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure,
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488.
19. See Reeves v. Warden, 226 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1964); United States ex rel.
Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Aldridge v. State, 278 Ala.
470, 179 So. 2d 51 (1965); Tribue v. State, 106 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1958); Lindsey v.
State, 204 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. 1965); Bucholtz v. Warden, 233 Md. 614, 195 A.2d
690 (1963); People v. Matthews, 21 App. Div. 2d 883, 251 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1964);
Lucas v. State, 368 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Grim. App. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 925
(1963); Nagel v. State, 126 Tex. Grim. 265, 71 S.W.2d 285 (1934); State v. Zuehlke,
239 Wis. 111, 300 N.W. 746 (1941).
20. See Curry v. United States, 192 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1951); People v. Washing-
ton, 163 Cal. App. 2d 833, 330 P.2d 67 (1958); Brown v. State, 155 Tex. Grim. 347,
235 S.W.2d 142 (1950).
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C. Procedural Deficiencies in Defendant's Case
If the defendant fails to make a timely objection to the introduction
of certain evidence, it will be admitted even though it was unconstitution-
ally seized.2 Other procedural deficiencies may preclude his raising an
objection on appeal.22 Yet some courts have unnecessarily "decided" the
third party consent issue in such situations.23
D. Searches Incident to a Valid Arrest
A reasonable search incident to a valid arrest is constitutional.2' When
a co-defendant has been arrested and a search made incident to his arrest
(and with his consent as well), the other defendant may'not successfully
attack the search on consent grounds.25 Because consent need not be
given in valid arrest cases, it should not be necessary for courts to consider
the issue."
E. Invalid or Unexecuted Search Warrants
Searches made pursuant to a valid and executed search warrant are,
of course, constitutional irrespective of consent.2 Problems arise, however,
when the warrant is invalid, or valid but unexecuted, and third party con-
21. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935
(1954); Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 844
(1948); Aldridge v. State, 278 Ala. 470, 179 So. 2d 51 (1965); In re Lessard, 62
Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d 39, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1965); People v. Walker, 27 Cal. Rptr.
225 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 154 So. 2d 289 (1963);
Petition of Watson, 146 Mont. 125, 404 P.2d 315 (1965).
22. Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).
23. E.g., Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 154 So. 2d 289 (1963).
24. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
25. If the police make a lawful entry pursuant to third party consent, see evidence
which gives probable cause to arrest, and make the arrest, they may then conduct a
reasonable search incident to the arrest. Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir.
1965); People v. Contreras, 211 Cal. App. 2d 641, 27 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1963); People
v. Amado, 208 Cal. App. 2d 780, 25 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1962); Shade v. State, 196 Ind.
665, 149 N.E. 348 (1925); Carter v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 695, 28 S.W.2d 976
(1930). However, one court found that there had been a reasonable search incident
to a lawful arrest solely because consent was given. If there had been no consent, the
search would have come too long after the arrest to have been incident thereto. Com-
monwealth v. Cabey, 201 Pa. Super. 433, 193 A.2d 663 (1963).
26. E.g., People v. Wright, 216 Cal. App. 2d 866, 31 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1963).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss1/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
sent is claimed as the basis for the search.2" When one is confronted with
a warrant, he will naturally acquiesce in a search. However, this is not
a voluntary acquiescence but is rather a submission to apparently legal
authority and should not be considered consent." Though these cases can
be decided solely on the warrant issue, several courts have unnecessarily
stated that wives may validly consent to a search for evidence to be used
against their husbands."0 However, if consent is obtained before the war-
rant is mentioned, the decision may depend on the validity of the consent
rather than that of the warrant.3 '
F. Consent to Enter
Third parties may give consent to enter a premises under circumstances
in which they may not give consent to search. 2 Generally, anyone with
the right to allow callers to enter, which is probably anyone lawfully on
the premises, may consent to an entry by police." Consent to enter is
28. United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920); Stroud v. Common-
wealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368 (1943); Bannister v. State, 112 Tex. Crim.
158, 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929); see United States v. Birrell, 243 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Ellis v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 220, 93 S.W.2d 438 (1936).
29. State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963). But see Combs v. Common-
wealth, 341 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1960); cf. Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 276, 142 Pac.
558 (1914).
30. See United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (E.D. Ohio 1920); State v. Pina,
94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963).
31. Joslin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 161, 305 S.W.2d 351 (1957); Miers v. State,
136 Tex. Crim. 475, 126 S.W.2d 484 (1939); Ellis v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 220, 93
S.W.2d 438 (1936); Bannister v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 158, 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929);
ef. Hook v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (effect upon
third party consent of magistrate's refusal to issue warrant). But see Garcia v. State,
138 Tex. Crim. 188, 135 S.W.2d 107 (1940). In United States v. Heine, 149 Fed.
485 (2d Cir. 1945), the possibility of obtaining an executive search warrant during
World War II somehow helped validate a "consent" in which the wife "at best resented
the search." Id. at 488.
32. Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965); see Davis v. United States,
327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant's minor daughter). See also State v. Scrotsky,
39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963).
33. People v. Walters, 148 Cal. App. 2d 426, 306 P.2d 606 (1962); Franklin v.
State, 208 Md. 628, 119 A.2d 439 (1956); Williams v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 347,
298 S.W.2d 590 (1956); Oakley v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 361, 214 S.W.2d 298 (1948);
Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 117 N.W.2d 626 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 844
(1963); see Miers v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 475, 126 S.W.2d 484 (1939). Contra,
United States v. Sully, 56 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). In State v. Scrotsky, 39
N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963), a landlady had a right to enter the leased premises
because she was using "self help" to repossess property the defendant had stolen from
her. She called the police to accompany her, and even though they could make a
lawful entry to protect her, it was held that they could not base a search and seizure
on her purported consent.
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invalid only when the police demand that the door be opened, 4 gain entry
by deceit,3" or fail to identify themselves. 31
After the police have entered, further consent is needed for a search."'
However, when the police are lawfully on the premises subsequent to a
third party consent to enter, and see evidence which gives them probable
cause to arrest, they may make the arrest and search incident to the arrest.3
Although reaching the same result, some courts do not employ this ratio-
nale; rather, they hold that because the police did not pry into hidden
places, there was no search, 9 and, thus, the fourth amendment need not
be complied with. Regardless of how a case is analyzed, the fourth amend-
ment certainly should apply when there has been a seizure, even if the
"no search" rationale applies.40
G. Consent Given by Co-Defendant
When a co-defendant consents to a search which leads to evidence
used against another defendant, several courts have indicated that the
third party consent rules described in Section II need not be applied,
apparently on the theory that since a defendant may consent to a search
for evidence to be used against himself, another defendant may not sue-
34. People v. Di Blasi, 228 Cal. App. 2d 338, 39 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1964).
35. People v. Porter, 227 Cal. App. 2d 211, 38 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1964).
36. People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939).
37. See People v. Carrillo, 50 Cal. Rptr. 185, 412 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1966).
38. Lindsey v. State, 204 N.E. 2d 357 (Ind. 1965); McGuire v. State, 200 Md.
601, 92 A.2d 582 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 928 (1953); Oakley v. State, 152
Tex. Crim. 361, 214 S.W.2d 298 (1948); see People v. Alvarez, 236 Cal. App. 2d 115,
45 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1965); cf. Reed v. Rhay, 323 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964). The police can, of course, testify to what they saw.
Oakley v. State, supra.
39. People v. Alvarez, 236 Cal. App. 2d 115, 45 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1965); People v.
Amado, 208 Cal. App. 2d 790, 25 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1962); Lindsey v. State, 204 N.E.2d
357 (Ind. 1965); Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964); State v.
Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965); cf. Aldridge v. State, 278 Ala. 470,
179 So. 2d 51 (1965).
40. E.g., People v. Garner, 234 Cal. App. 2d 241, 44 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1965);
People v. Speice, 23 Il. 2d 38, 177 N.E.2d 122 (1961); People v. Helmus, 50 Misc.
2d 47, 269 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Nassau County Ct. 1966). In Commonwealth v. Wright,
411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963), the court held that though the evidence may not
have been obtained through a "search," the reasonableness requirement of the fourth
amendment was still applicable.
The evidence may still be seized pursuant to a warrant or any of the fourth amend-
ment exceptions, including third party consent. However, it is interesting to note that
if an original entry was unlawful-and the evidence was in plain view-subsequent third
party acquiescence in the entry will not validate the seizure. People v. Boyle, 39 Misc.
2d 917, 242 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Port Jervis City Ct. 1963).
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cessfully challenge the consent."' (If the evidence could be used only
against the consenter, all co-defendants might be immunized from con-
viction.) Other courts apply the usual consent rules, however, recognizing
that from the point of view of the nonconsenting defendant, the case is
indistinguishable from one in which the consenting party is not also a
defendant, and that, analytically, the mere fact that the evidence is also
to be used against the consenter is of no special relevance. 2
H. Searches by Private Citizens
If a private citizen makes a search, seizes evidence, and hands it to the
police, the evidence is admissible without any reference to third party
consent law.43 However, when an individual invites the police to conduct
a search with him, the courts have held that this is not a search by an
individual but a search by the police incident to a third party's consent,
and have applied the rules discussed in Section II to determine whether
the consent validated the search."
In cases in which a joint occupant, in response to the directions of the
police, seeks out and hands over the requested items, some courts entirely
avoid the issue of who made the search by holding that there has been no
search. 5
II. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DECIDING THE
THRD PARTY CONSENT ISSUE
If none of the factors discussed above is determinative of the search
and seizure issue, the court must decide if the consent given by a third
party is sufficient to validate an otherwise unconstitutional search. Because
such decisions are based on the fourth amendment, the ultimate question
41. Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
979 (1965). As one court put it, a joint defendant cannot "vicariously assert the con-
stitutional rights of others who do not complain." Curry v. United States, 192 F.2d
571 (5th Cir. 1951).
42. E.g., Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 944 (1966); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 935 (1954); People v. La Peluso, 239 Cal. App. 2d 715, 49 Cal. Rptr. 85
(1966); People v. Guyette, 231 Cal. App. 2d 460, 41 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1964).
43. Eisentrager v. State, 79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963); Lucas v. State, 368
S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 925 (1963); see Marshall v.
United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966);
People v. Helmus, 50 Misc. 2d 47, 269 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Nassau County Ct. 1966); cf.,
Day v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 614, 252 S.W.2d 180 (1952).
44. State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963); see Gutridge v. State, 236
Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964).
45. See, e.g., Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964); State v.
Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965).
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in each case is whether the search and seizure is made reasonable by the
)consent."' To decide this issue, the courts consider several elements of
the search. Any one or more of these elements may be present in a given
case, and in many cases no single element is decisive. Moreover, some
courts do not recognize the significance of some of these factors.
A. Relationship between Consenter and Searched Premises
Courts have often looked to the consenter's property interest in the
searched premises to test the validity of third party consent. The most
accurate generalization which can be gleaned from the cases consid-
ering this relationship is that consent may be validly given by one having
a right to the possession and control of the premises.4" Of course, if
the consenter's right to possession and control is superior to that of the
defendant, the case is still stronger.4 s
The general rule can best be illustrated through a discussion of the
distinctions drawn in cases in which the consenting party is the defendant's
landlord. A landlord may not validly consent if his only right to posses-
sion and control is incident to his status as landlord; for example, his right
to view the premises for waste. 9 However, his consent may be valid if
he has a right to temporary possession granted by the occupant-tenant."
Otherwise, consent can be validly given only after the tenant has termi-
nated his possessory rights in the premises. 5 Thus, if the tenant has
46. Foster v. United States, 281 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1960); Holzhey v. United
States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); Lindsey v. State, 204 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. 1965); Eisentrager v. State, 79
Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963).
47. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935
(1954) (partner); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1946) (employee); People v. Banks, 238 Cal. App. 2d 43, 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1965)
(roommate); People v. Palmer, 31 Ill. 2d 58, 198 N.E.2d 839 (1964) (wife); People
v. Palmer, 26 Il1. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963)
(tenant); Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 443, 138 S.W.2d 956 (1940) (landlord);
McGraw v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 239, 270 S.W. 832 (1925) (fellow employee);
Gray v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 610, 249 S.W. 769 (1923) (parent); State v.
McCreary, 179 Neb. 589, 139 N.W.2d 362 (1966) (host); Bannister v. State, 112 Tex.
Crim. 158, 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929) (husband).
48. State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965) (parent); see
United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (parent);
State v. Hagan, 47 Idaho 315, 274 Pac. 628 (1929) (parent).
49. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); ef. Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964).
50. See United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966).
51. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Feguer v. United States, 302
F.2d 214 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962); People v. Thomsen, 239 Cal.
App. 2d 84, 48 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1965); People v. Crayton, 174 Cal. App. 2d 267, 344
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breached a condition, giving the landlord the right to evict him, the land-
lord cannot effectively consent if the tenant is still in possession."
Courts have carefully distinguished searches of areas in which the land-
lord has some rights of possession or control.5 The landlord may consent
to a search of a common passageway 4 or bathroom"5 or a closet outside
the tenant's room. 6 Of course, a landlord who is a co-occupant with his
tenant has a right to immediate possession and control.5 '
The general rule that consent is valid if the consenter has the right to
possession and control is often expressed in other ways. Joint occupants
clearly have a right to possession and control of the jointly occupied premi-
ses and the status of joint occupancy has been said to be sufficient to
validate third party consent.5 Some courts have added weight to decisions
applying the general rule by commenting, when they could, that the con-
senter was the "head of the household"5 9 or has exclusive possession and
control of the premises.6" Another makeweight, used when appropriate,
P.2d 627 (1959); Eisentrager v. State, 79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782 (1964).
52. Antoszewski v. State, 5 Ohio Op. 264, 31 N.E.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1936); cf.
Johnson v. United States, 358 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1966). However, by denying his
possessory interest, the tenant may validate the absentee landlord's consent. Bucholz
v. Warden, 233 Md. 614, 195 A.2d 690 (1963); cf. Elledge v. United States, 359
F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1966). But cf. People v. Paris, 63 Cal. 2d 566, 407 P.2d 282, 47
Cal. Rptr. 370 (1965). See also State v. Mark, 46 N.J. 262, 216 A.2d 377 (1966).
53. See State v. Medley, 400 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1966) (consent to enter).
54. People v. Corrao, 201 Cal. App. 2d 848, 20 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1962).
55. Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829
(1965).
56. People v. Manning, 239 Cal. App. 2d 416, 49 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1966); People
v. Hicks, 165 Cal. App. 2d 548, 331 P.2d 1003 (1958).
57. Milyonico v. United States, 53 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1931); People v. Davis, 211
Cal. App. 2d 455, 27 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1962); cf. Drummond v. United States, 350
F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966).
58. Driskill v. Unites, 281 Fed. 146 (9th Cir. 1922) (roomer); People v. Banks, 238
Cal. App. 2d 48, 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1965) (roommate); People v. Coblentz, 229 Cal.
App. 2d 296, 40 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1964) (mistress); People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d
638, 334 P.2d 105 (1960) (mistress); People v. Palmer, 26 Ill. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d
236 (1962) (roomer); People v. Shambley, 4 Il. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954)
(wife); McGraw v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 239, 270 S.W. 832 (1925) (fellow
employee); McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964) (parent); Van Wyck
v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 241, 37 P.2d 321 (1934) (landlord); State v. Cairo, 74 R.I.
377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948) (wife).
59. Morris v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d 58 (1948) (parent);
State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965) (parent); Bannister v.
State, 112 Tex. Crim. 158. 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929) (husband).
60. Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 312
(1966); People v. Crayton, 174 Cal. App. 2d 267, 344 P.2d 627 (1959); State v.
Cook, 242 Ore. 535, 411 P.2d 78 (1966); see Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
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is that the consenter was "in charge of the premises" at the time of the
search."' And if the owner of the premises is the consenting joint occupant,
his ownership may be mentioned by a court to support the validity of his
consent0-
However, it should be noted that these formulations, as well as the
general possession-control rule, cannot be relied upon to validate a con-
sent in every case in which they apply.63 For example, if the consenting
joint occupant is away from the premises when he consents, and the
defendant is present when the search is made, the consent is invalid,
despite the rights of the joint occupant.6"
The landlord-tenant cases demonstrate that the possession-control rule
(1960). The statement that the consenter has exclusive possession and control usually
means nothing more than that the defendant was not present at the time of the
search. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
980 (1965); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946);
In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d 39, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1965); People v.
Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957).
When the consenter was the owner of the article seized, the exclusive possession
rationale has been applied to the article, rather than the premises. United States v.
El Rancho Adolphus Prods., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 645 (M.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d
367 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976 (1957); Aldridge v. State, 278 Ala. 470,
179 So. 2d 51 (1965); People v. Matthews, 21 App. Div. 2d 883, 251 N.Y.S.2d 736
(1964).
61. Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1945) (apartment house
superintendent); United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (wife);
People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal. App. 2d 63, 300 P.2d 194 (1956); State v. Griswold,
67 Conn. 290, 34 At. 1046 (1896); (employee); Morris v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky.
349, 208 S.W.2d 77 (1948) (parent).
62. People v. Rodriquez, 212 Cal. App. 2d 525, 28 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963) (wife);
Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1960) (grandparent); Gray v. Com-
monwealth, 198 Ky. 610, 249 S.W. 769 (1923) (parent); Gordon v. State, 160 So.
2d 73 (Miss. 1964) (step-parent); Petition of Watson, 146 Mont. 125, 404 P.2d 315
(1965) (wife); State v. Hunt, 178 Neb. 783, 135 N.W.2d 475 (1965) (parent); Hook
v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (wife); State v. Fowler,
172 N.C. 905, 90 S.E. 408 (1916) (sister); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 202 Pa.
Super. 360, 195 A.2d 817 (1963) (parent).
The ownership makeweight is also applied if the defendant and the consenter are
joint owners. People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958); Bellam v.
State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964); State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841
(1948) ; see Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948).
63. For example, a twenty year old employee-in charge of the business while the
defendant, his employer, was on vacation-whose only duties were to keep the place
open for shipments, to keep it clean, and to handle a small amount of business, could
not validly consent to a search for evidence to be used against his employer. This
result was reached even though the consenter had exclusive possession and control at
the time. United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
64. Tompkins v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889
(1963).
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is based upon the relationship of the consenting party to the premises
searched. The general rule can be further illustrated by considering the
position of a nonresident, temporary guest who is lawfully in the apart-
ment or home which is to be searched when consent is requested. As is
true of a landlord, a guest does not have the right to possess or control the
premises. Though a nonresident, temporary guest" can validly give con-
sent to enter,66 no court has upheld a consent to search given by such a
guest.
67
B. Exclusive Use
Some jurisdictions which decide the validity of consent on the basis of
the consenter's interest in the searched premises invalidate any consent to
search a part of the premises or a closed container" in which the defendant
had rights superior to those of the consenter. A recent federal case invali-
dated a consent given by the defendant's mother to search his private
bureau because its "exclusive use""5 was enjoyed by the defendant. On
the other hand, though only the defendant had been behind the basement
stairs, that area was held not subject to his exclusive use because others
had the right to use it.7" The exclusive use doctrine applies when others
can enter the area only with the defendant's permission-for example, to
return laundry to the bureau drawer-but not when others have an
independent right to enter the area.
Whether the area searched is within the exclusive use doctrine may
depend upon what is sought. If, with an employer's consent, the police
look for and seize a purse from an employee's desk drawer, it can be
reasoned that the employee had exclusive use of the desk to store her
purse and that the doctrine should apply. If the subject of the search was
business papers, the evidence would be admissible because the employee
could not exclude others wishing to enter for business-connected purposes."
65. Such a person has the smallest interest in a premises of all who might lawfully
be present. See United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D.
Pa. 1963); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963).
66. Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Contreras, 211
Cal. App. 2d 641, 27 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1963). See also People v. Corrao, 201 Cal. App.
2d 848, 20 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1962). But see People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d
1020 (1939).
67. See Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Dent, 371 Ill.
33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939).
68. People v. Overton, 51 Misc. 2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
69. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915, 925 (4th Cir. 1965).
70. Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964).
71. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The court did not say
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The exclusive use doctrine may apply only when it is reasonably apparent
that the area or container searched belonged solely to the defendant. 2
Thus, there seems to be a stronger tendency to apply the doctrine if the
police had to break into something to effect the seizure, because this dem-
onstrates that the consenting party was excluded from its use.73
Though the cases developing the exclusive use doctrine have been
carefully reasoned, most jurisdictions have not yet adopted it.74 The num-
ber of cases employing the exclusive use rule is increasing, however, and
the doctrine may be of growing importance.
C. Relationship Between Consenter and Defendant
Even if the consenter has the requisite relationship to the premises, in
some jurisdictions his consent may be invalid because of his relationship
to the defendant.7s
1. Consent by Spouse
Instances in which consent was given by the defendant's wife provide
whether the item seized or the original intent of the officers was governing. See State
v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962).
Some courts hold the consent invalid if the police were seeking the defendant's
"personal effects." Invariably, the exclusive use doctrine is being applied. Holzhey v.
United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Blok, supra; State v.
Evans, supra; People v. Gonzalez, 50 Misc. 2d 508, 270 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
If there were a rule which excluded the defendant's personal effects, seldom would a
third party consent search by valid. A personal effect would seem to be any item of
which the defendant is the sole owner or possessor. In Roberts v. United States, 332
F.2d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 980 (1965), the court held
that a bullet lodged in the ceiling was not a personal effect, since it did not have an
"intimate relation to the person of the firer of the weapon."
72. Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 384 U.S.
312 (1966).
73. Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); see People v. Cruz,
61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964).
74. In the following cases the exclusive use doctrine could have been applied but
was not mentioned: Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 944 (1965); People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 292 P.2d 513 (1956), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1957); People v. Shepard, 212 Cal. App. 2d 697, 28 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1963); People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 2d 88, 314 P.2d 58 (1957); Tomlinson v.
State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937); See State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136
N.W.2d 577 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966); Williams v. State, 164 Tex.
Crim. 347, 298 S.W.2d 590 (1956).
75. Several discussions of third party consent have been centered around the con-
senter-defendant relationship. I J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND IMMUNITMS
419-50 (1961); Comment, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to a Search and Seizure of
the Husband's Property, 69 DIcK. L. REV. 69 (1964); Note, Effective Consent to
Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964); 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 653; Annot.,
31 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953).
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the largest number of third party consent cases. When a consideration of
this issue is necessary to a decision, the majority of cases hold that consent
given by a wife is just as effective as consent given by any other person."
76. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
981 (1965); United States v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
885 (1945); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d. Cir. 1945); United States
v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d
39, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1965); People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957);
People v. Leal, 46 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), vacated, 413 P.2d 665, 50
Cal. Rptr. 777 (Cal. 1966); People v. Alvarez, 236 Cal. App. 2d 106, 45 Cal. Rptr.
721 (1965); People v. Garner, 234 Cal. App. 2d 212, 44 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1965);
People v. Rodriquez, 212 Cal. App. 2d 525, 28 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963); People v.
Megliorino, 192 Cal. App. 2d 525, 13 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1961); People v. Dominguez,
144 Cal. App. 2d 63, 300 P.2d 194 (1956); People v. Harvey, 48 Il. App. 2d 261,
199 N.E.2d 236 (1964); People v. Palmer, 31 Il1. 2d 58, 198 N.E.2d 839 (1964);
People v. Speice, 23 Ill. 2d 40, 177 N.E.2d 233 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 848
(1962); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1004 (1959); People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); Gutridge
v. State, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964); Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196
A.2d 891 (1964); Commonwealth v. Cabey, 201 Pa. Super. 433, 193 A.2d 663 (1963);
Joslin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 161, 305 S.W.2d 351 (1957); Padilla v. State, 160
Tex. Crim. 618, 273 S.W.2d 889 (1954); Brown v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 347, 235
S.W.2d 142 (1950); Ennox v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 328, 94 S.W.2d 473 (1936);
Ellis v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 220, 93 S.W.2d 438 (1936); Cass v. State, 124 Tex.
Grim. 208, 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933); See Aldridge v. State, 278 Ala. 470, 179 So. 2d 51
(1965); State v. Koelzer, 348 Mo. 468, 154 S.W.2d 84 (1941); Petition of Watson,
146 Mont. 470, 404 P.2d 315 (1965); State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d
322 (1965); Hook v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Camp v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 68, 104 P.2d 572 (1940); Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore.
276, 142 Pac. 558 (1914); State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948); cf.
United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd, 184 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
The following cases have held such a consent to search inadequate, either because of
coercion or another matter which should be isolated from the consent issue, or because
of an express rule that wives may not consent: Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493
(1958); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920); Foster v. United States, 281
F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1960); Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930);
United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920); Fitter v. United States,
258 Fed. 567 (2d Cir. 1919); State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963);
State v. Darwin, 25 Conn. Supp. 153, 198 A.2d 715 (Super. Ct. 1964); Rivers v.
State, 59 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1952); Sheftall v. Zipperer, 133 Ga. 488, 66 S.E. 253
(1909); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962); People v. Lind, 370
Ill. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938); Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952);
Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1959); Stroud v. Commonwealth,
295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368 (1943); Meredith v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 705, 286
S.W. 1043 (1926); Duncan v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 841, 250 S.W. 101 (1923);
Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 154 So. 2d 289 (1963), vacated on procedural grounds,
379 U.S. 443 (1965); State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W.2d 794 (1942);
People v. Beshany, 43 Misc. 2d 521, 252 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1964); State v. Hall,
264 N.C. 559, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965); State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965);
State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 506
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The well-reasoned recent cases do not invalidate a consent solely because
it was given by a wife. Courts recognize that early statements that wives
cannot consent are found in cases which reached the correct result, but
are not authority in all circumstances." An example would be the cases
in which coercion vitiated what may have been an otherwise valid con-
sent."8 The trend has been toward greater acceptance of the validity of
consents given by wives.
A mistress, or woman living with the defendant, has been considered a
wife for consent purposes.t In the few cases in which a husband has
consented to a search directed against his wife, the rules are similar to
those in the more common situation."0 There may be a tendency to approve
a consent by a husband more readily than a consent by a wife if he
owns the premises, because he is head of the household."'
2. Consent by Parents and Other Relatives
Of all the possible relationships between the consenting party and the
defendant, the parent-child combination is most likely to result in a court's
holding a search valid.8 2 Perhaps this means nothing more than that the
(1936); Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951); Commonwealth
v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963); Humes v. Tabor, I R.I. 464 (1850); Kelly
v. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545 (1946); Byrd v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30
S.W.2d 273 (1930); Garcia v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 180, 135 S.W.2d 107 (1940);
State v. Bonolo, 39 Wyo. 299, 270 Pac. 1065 (1928).
77. E.g., People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); State v. Evans, 45
Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962).
78. E.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920).
79. Stein v. United States, 166 F. 2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844
(1948); People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966);
People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 388 P.2d 665, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1964); People v.
Guyette, 231 Cal. App. 2d 460, 41 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1964); People v. Smith, 183 Cal.
App. 2d 670, 6 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1960); People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334
P.2d 105 (1958); Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879
(1962); Brown v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 347, 235 S.W.2d 142 (1950).
80. Jones v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 358, 177 P.2d 148 (1946) ; Bannister v. State, 112
Tex. Crim. 158, 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929); cf. People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 217 N.W.
797 (1928).
81. See cases cited note 80 supra.
82. Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965); United States ex reL McKenna v.
Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 342 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 857 (1965); United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D.
Pa. 1963) ; People v. Walker, 27 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); People v. Ortiz, 210
Cal. App. 2d 489, 26 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1962); People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 2d 88, 314
P.2d 58 (1957); People v. Cahan, 150 Cal. App. 2d 786, 310 P.2d 661 (1957); Tom-
linson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937); State v. Hagan, 47 Idaho 315, 274
Pac. 628 (1927); People v. Polenik, 407 Ill. 337, 95 N.E.2d 414 (1950); Morris v.
Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d 58 (1948); Gray v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky.
610, 249 S.W. 769 (1923); McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964); State
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parent has the right to possession and control of the premises and, thus,
can consent to a search . 3 However, some jurisdictions which recognize
the exclusive use doctrine may refuse to apply it when a parent consents
to the search of a minor child's room.8"
Valid consent has also been given by a grandfather, " a brother," a sis-
ter,87 a step-father,88 a sister-in-law,89 a brother-in-law, 0 and a great aunt."'
If the consenting relative is not a parent, the relationship itself is unlikely
to affect the decision on the validity of the consent; rather, the usual rela-
tionship to the premises rules will be controlling. However, though minor
children may give consent to enter,9" their consent to a search will not
validate it.93
3. Consent by Employers and Employees94
An employee's consent to a search for evidence to be used against his
v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909
(1966); State v. Hunt, 178 Neb. 783, 135 N.W.2d 475 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
994 (1966); Hahn v. State, 38 Ohio App. 461, 176 N.E. 164 (1930); Commonwealth
v. McKenna, 202 Pa. Super. 360, 195 A.2d 817 (1963); Williams v. State, 164 Tex.
Crin. 347, 298 S.W.2d 590 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850 (1957); State v. Tuttle,
16 Utah 2d 288, 399, P.2d 580, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 872 (1965). The following cases
found the search to be invalid: Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965) (ex-
clusive use doctrine; defendant over twenty-one); Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky.
443, 138 S.W.2d 956 (1940) (implied coercion); cf. United States v. Roberts, 179 F.
Supp. 478 (D.D.C. 1959).
83. Notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
84. See State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 909 (1966); State v. Hunt, 178 Neb. 783, 135 N.W.2d 475 (1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 994 (1966); cf. Woodward v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
85. Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1960).
86. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935
(1954); People v. Lind. 370 Ill. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938).
87. Carter v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 695, 28 S.W.2d 976 (1930); State v. Fowler,
172 N.C. 905, 90 S.E. 408 (1916).
88. Gordon v. State, 160 So. 2d 73 (Miss. 1964).
89. People v. Kinard, 210 Cal. App. 2d 85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1962); People v.
Ransome, 180 Cal. App. 2d 140, 4 Cal. Rptr. 347, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 887 (1960).
90. People v. Silva, 140 Cal. App. 2d 791, 295 P.2d 942 (1956).
91. Woodward v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930
(1958).
92. Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964); cf. Franklin v. State, 208
Md. 628, 119 A.2d 439 (1956); People v. Boyle, 39 Misc. 2d 917, 242 N.Y.S.2d 90
(Port Jervis City Ct. 1963).
93. See People v. Jennings, 142 Cal. App. 2d 160, 298 P.2d 56 (1956). The same is
true of an incompetent adult. People v. Walker, 34 Ill. 2d 23, 213 N.E.2d 552 (1966)
(dictum).
94. An employer-employee relationship does not exist between partners. Hence, the
discussion in this sub-section does not apply to a consent given by one partner to a
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employer has been held valid. If the employer has instructed the employee
to permit the search, there is no problem in upholding the consent.95 How-
ever, when there is no express authority, the approaches taken by the
courts seem to vary. Some courts recognize that an employee is an agent
and may possess apparent authority to permit a search.9" It must then be
determined whether the employee's powers included control over the area
searched and the item seized97 and whether the police reasonably believed
that this was the case. Other courts merely look to whether the employee
had sufficient possession and control of the premises to permit searches.
To determine sufficient possession and control, the courts look to the impor-
tance of the position held by the employee and the amount of responsibility
vested in him by his employer. So, an office manager who ordinarily cares
for corporate papers may consent to a "search" of the papers."9 In fact,
the two approaches are very similar though the latter does not expressly
consider agency principles."'
An employer may validly consent to a search for evidence to be used
against an employee by virtue of the possession and control rule, 0 1 but the
search for evidence to be used against another partner. Such searches have been upheld.
United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954);
United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961); People v. Herrmann, 40
Misc. 2d 1089, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (Sup. Ct. 1963). If the consenter is also a defendant,
there may be no question that the evidence is admissible. Notes 41-42 supra and accom-
panying text.
An independent contractor also is not an employee; the cases dealing with consent by
an independent contractor involve situations in which the defendant has bailed the seized
property to an accountant or attorney. These cases are discussed in notes 138-39 infra
and accompanying text.
If the employer-defendant is a corporation, consent by an employee may be considered
consent by the defendant rather than by a third party. Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp.
961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
95. Brown v. State, 81 Nev. 397, 404 P.2d 428 (1965).
96. See United States v. Ruffner, 51 F.2d 579 (D. Md. 1931); Hays v. State, 38
Okla. Crim. 331, 261 Pac. 232 (1927); State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046
(1896) (concurring opinion).
97. United States v. Ruffner, 51 F.2d 579 (D. Md. 1931).
98. See Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), appeal dismissed, 334
F.2d 742 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
99. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 742 (1946); see State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046 (1896); cf.
United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
100. The application of both articulations to the same case may have caused some
confusion. Raine v. United States, 299 Fed. 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 611
(1924); United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v.
Lagow, 66 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947).
101. E.g., McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 239, 270 S.W. 832 (1925).
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exclusive use doctrine may be controlling if the search is of the employee's
desk. 02
4. Consent by Landlords and Tenants
The validity of a consent by a landlord or tenant to a search for evidence
to be used against the other is not dependent on the relationship between
the parties but rather on the relationship between the consenting party and
the premises.'
D. Hostility of Consenter To Defendant
It has been held that when a wife's attitude in inviting and consenting
to a search against her husband is one of hostility, the consent cannot vali-
date an otherwise unreasonable search."0 California has accepted this
position,' but has refused to extend it to cases in which the spouse's hostil-
ity was not apparent to the police. This is justified by the general Cali-
fornia attitude which looks to police conduct, and the likelihood that other-
wise an "estrangement!' would be claimed in any case in which the spouse
consented.' Furthermore, the hostility doctrine is not applicable when
the consenter seeks the aid of the police to protect herself.'' Some courts
have simply failed to consider the doctrine, implicitly rejecting it.'
B. Whereabouts of Defendant
If the defendant is not present when third party consent to a search is
given, his whereabouts has no effect on the decision. Even if the defendant
is in police custody and has refused to consent,0" or if his conduct has not
102. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Another subsequent
employee may give the police evidence left in his desk by a predecessor. State v. Fowler,
172 N.C. 905, 90 S.E. 408 (1916).
103. For a discussion of cases dealing with consent by a landlord see notes 49-57 supra
and accompanying text. Tenants may consent to a search of the leased premises because
they have the right to possession and control. Driskill v. United States, 281 Fed. 146
(9th Cir. 1922); People v. Palmer, 26 Ill. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236 (1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 951 (1963); Dyer v. State, 61 Okla. Crim. 202, 66 P.2d 1104 (1937).
104. Kelley v. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545 (1946).
105. See People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); People v. Howard,
166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958).
106. In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d 39, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1965).
107. People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); see People v. Howard,
166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958).
108. Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844
(1948); People v. Helmus, 50 Misc. 2d 47, 269 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Nassau County Ct.
1966); see Hook v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
109. People v. Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d 670, 6 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1960); People v.
Ransome, 180 Cal. App. 2d 140, 4 Cal. Rptr. 347, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 887 (1960).
But see Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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been requested,"' the police may conduct a search pursuant to third party
consent. But when the defendant is present and objecting to the search, and
the third party consent was obtained away from the premises, the consent is
ineffective."' One important recent case held that if the person against
whom the search is directed is present, that person's express objection
invalidates the search and overrides the consent given by a third party who
is on the premises."' However, in most of the cases in which the defendant
was present (and not objecting) during the search, the issue did not seem to
be considered important, and the third party consent was held valid."' At
times, of course, the police do not direct the search at a specific person in the
sense that they expect to find evidence to be used against that person rather
than anyone else. When this is true, they cannot be expected to ask the con-
sent of the eventual defendant merely because he is present during the
search. However, even when the police realize they are searching for
evidence to be used against someone who is present but not asked to consent,
the cases indicate that the defendant's presence is insignificant in the ab-
sence of an express objection by him before the search is made."'
F. Authority to Consent
Although many cases dealing with third party consent speak in terms of
the consenter's authority, implied authority, or apparent authority to permit
the search, few of these cases use the word "authority" in the usually under-
110. E.g., Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944
(1965); People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); People v. Banks, 238
Cal. App. 2d 43, 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1965).
111. Tompkins v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889
(1963) (per Traynor, J.); see People v. Murillo, 241 Cal. App. 2d 227, 50 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1966).
112. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965). Contra, People v. Walker, 27
Cal. Rptr. 225 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
113. People v. La Peluso, 239 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966); People
v. Walker, 27 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d
670, 6 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1960); People v. Silva, 140 Cal. App. 2d 791, 295 P.2d 942
(1956); People v. Walker, 34 Ill. 2d 23, 213 N.E.2d 552 (1966); Bannister v.
State, 112 Tex. Crim. 158, 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929); cf. United States v. Sergio, 21 F.
Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); People v. Ortiz, 210 Cal. App. 2d 489, 26 Cal. Rptr. 677
(1962). Contra, Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965).
If the defendant had no right of control over the premises, his presence will not
invalidate the consent. Tribue v. State, 106 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1958); Shade v. State,
196 Ind. 665, 149 N.E. 348 (1925); Carter v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 695, 28 S.W.2d
976 (1930); see People v. Cahan, 150 Cal. App. 2d 786, 310 P.2d 661 (1957); Gordon
v. State, 160 So. 2d 73 (Miss. 1964). Contra, People v. Murillo, 241 Cal. App. 2d 227,
50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966).
114. See cases cited note 111 supra.
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stood agency law context."' In fact, the word is usually used to express
the conclusion that the search is valid or invalid, rather than the reason
for the decision. 6
G. Police Conduct: The California Rule
Certain police conduct may lead to a finding that a consent was in-
voluntarily given and was thus invalid.11 In such cases, the third party
consent issue need not be considered at all. In California, the courts look
to police conduct to test whether a third party consent validated a search.
(Of course, all jurisdictions look to police conduct when the consent is
claimed to have been obtained by coercion, but this is a separate matter.) 1 8
Justice Traynor suggested the California approach in People v. Gorg, 11
when he stated, "We are... concerned with... discouraging unreasonable
activity on the part of law enforcement officers."1 '
In Gorg, the defendant was a law student who lived in the home of
a family friend in return for light gardening services. The police searched
the defendant's room after obtaining the consent of the home owner and
found narcotics, which were introduced at the trial. The court concluded
that the consent should be upheld because the police acted in good faith,
reasonably beleiving that the consenter had authority to permit the search.
The approach presented in Gorg may be significantly different from
that followed in other jurisdictions. It is impossible to discern whether
the court considered Gorg a tenant, a servant, or a guest. If he was a
tenant, other jurisdictions almost certainly would not have upheld the
search. 21 If Gorg was a servant or guest, other courts might not have
approved the search because of the exclusive use doctrine. 2 However,
because the California court decided the issue in terms of "unreasonable
activity on the part of law enforcement officers," it did not have to con-
sider these problems.
115. Those cases which actually employ agency principles are discussed in notes
95-102 supra and accompanying text and notes 115-16 infra and accompanying text.
California cases referring to "apparent authority" in a non-agency sense are considered
in the next subsection.
116. See, e.g., Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Carlton v.
State, 111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933); Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509
(1952); Cass v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 208, 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933).
117. Notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text.
119. 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
120. Id. at 783, 291 P.2d at 474.
121. Notes 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
122. Notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
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The lower courts have interpreted Gorg and other California Supreme
Court cases123 as formulating a rule that a consent will be upheld if the
consenter had apparent authority to permit the search. 24 However, in
Stoner v. California, 1 2 1 the state attempted to apply the test to a consent
given by a hotel manager to search a guest's room. The United States
Supreme Court held the consent invalid and criticized an approach based
on "strained applications of the law of agency or . . .'apparent author-
ity.' "'2' It is unclear whether the Supreme Court held the entire Califor-
nia approach invalid, or merely that the police in that case could not rea-
sonably assume that the clerk had been authorized to permit a search.
The California Supreme Court has subsequently held that Stoner applies
only to the hotel clerk-guest relationship and has continued to use the
apparent authority rule. 7
Because of the possible conflict between the California approach and
the Supreme Court's opinion in Stoner, it is essential to examine the limits
of the California rule. The language of some California cases indicates
that the police must reasonably believe that the consenter has authority
from the defendant to consent to a search.' Yet, in most of the cases
validating a consent, the police could not have reasonably assumed that
the defendant had expressly authorized anything of the kind.'29 It appears
that the rule actually is that police must reasonably believe that the con-
senter had authority and control over the area searched and the object
seized. "' For example, it is doubtful that any one could reasonably believe
123. People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 292 P.2d 513, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956); see People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957).
124. People v. Leal, 46 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), vacated, 413 P.2d 665,
50 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Cal. 1966) (wife); People v. Nelson, 218 Cal. App. 2d 359, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 675 (1963) (mistress); People v. Ransome, 180 Cal. App. 2d 140, 4 Cal. Rptr.
347 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 887 (1961) (sister-in-law); People v. Howard, 166
Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958) (mistress); People v. Ambrose, 155 Cal. App.
2d 513, 318 P.2d 181 (1957) (landlord); People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. 2d 471, 313
P.2d 206 (1957) (baby sitter). The authority of the Ambrose case is very doubtful in
view of People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956). Both of these cases
preceded Chapman which was decided in 1961.
125. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
126. Id. at 488. See Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 968 (1966).
127. People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 838, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966).
128. E.g., People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955); People v. Kinard,
210 Cal. App. 2d 85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1962); People v. Corrao, 201 Cal. App. 2d
848, 20 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1962); see People v. Davis, 211 Cal. App. 2d 455, 27 Cal. Rptr.
436 (1962).
129. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); People v. Gorg,
45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
130. E.g., People v. Potter, 49 Cal. Rptr. 892 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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that a defendant had given a baby sitter authority to consent to a search;
but, in caring for the children, she did have control of the entire premises
and the articles seized, and this was sufficient to allow her to consent under
the California rule.'31
In many cases, application of the apparent authority rule leads to the
result that would be reached in other jurisdictions. While other courts
usually decide the consent issue by looking to the relationship between
the consenter and the searched premises, 3 ' California looks to the same
relationship but only to determine if the police reasonably believed that
the consenter had authority over the area searched.' "3 Theoretically, at
least, the California courts will validate a greater number of third party
consent searches, and in fact this seems to be the case. In California if
the requisite relationship between the consenter and the premises does not
exist, a consent will be held valid if it is found that the police reasonably
believed that the relationship existed.
H. Consent by Bailees
Singular problems arise when the defendant has bailed the seized prop-
erty to the consenter. Because the defendant has entrusted the chattel to
the bailee, the possession and control rule would validate the consent in
all such cases."' However, the relatively few bailment cases have not
been so analyzed.
Some courts have upheld the bailee's consent by reasoning that the
defendant accepted the risk of a search and seizure by giving the article
131. People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 313 P.2d 206 (1957). Some opinions
do not use the "apparent authority to consent to a search" language but rather apparent
control over the premises. People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 292 P.2d 513 (1956),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1957); People v. Garner, 234 Cal. App. 2d 212, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1965).
132. Notes 47-67 supra and accompanying text. Occasionally other jurisdictions have
applied the California reasoning. Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.
1955); see State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962). Courts may be more
likely to find a search reasonable ff the consenter invited the police into the premises.
This may be an indication that they consider the police conduct more reasonable. Mc-
Cray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1963); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 202 Pa.
Super. 360, 195 A.2d 817 (1963); Williams v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 374, 298 S.W.2d
590 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850 (1958) (consent to enter); Oakley v. State, 152
Tex. Crim. 361, 214 S.W.2d 298 (1948); cf. Gordon v. State, 160 So. 2d 73 (Miss.
1964).
133. People v. Banks, 238 Cal. App. 2d 43, 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1965); People v.
Ransome, 180 Cal. App. 2d 140, 4 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1960); People v. Silva, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 791, 295 P.2d 942 (1956); see People v. Coblentz, 229 Cal. App. 2d 296, 40
Cal. Rptr. 116 (1964); People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958).
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to a third party. 3 ' (However, this view has recently been discredited.)". 6
On the other hand, if the defendant expressly denies the bailee the right
to let others inspect the property, any consent will be invalid." 7 Courts
have placed emphasis on the type of article seized. So, an accountant
did not possess such "dominion" over tax records that he could authorize
a seizure of them."' When this approach is taken, the courts seem to
look to the expectations of the bailor.
Two cases involving bailed automobiles have raised special problems,
and received considerable attention. Because of the automobile's mobility,
courts have consistently approved more liberal search rules in automobile
search cases."' In the much-cited case of United States v. Eldridge,4 ' the
Fourth Circuit held that when an automobile is loaned to a friend, the
latter may consent to a search of the trunk. 4' Such consent was thought
to be "not inconsistent with its entrustment."'' However, if it would have
been necessary to explore behind the upholstery or under the carpeting,
or if the defendant had warned his friend of the contraband or specifically
limited his rights under the bailment, the consent might have been held
inconsistent with the bailment.
The later case of State v. Bernius"4" appears to have contradicted
Eldridge. Bernius interpreted Eldridge as based on an apparent authority
rationale which had been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in
Stoner v. California.4 The court also held that the mere entrustment
of possession and control of an automobile does not include authority to
consent to a search. Further, in Bernius, the police knew that the con-
134. See Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 938 (1966); United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962); Cutting
v. United States, 169 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1948); Clarke v. State, 402 S.W.2d 863
(Tenn.), cert denied, 87 S. Ct. 303 (1966).
135. E.g., Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 938 (1966); see United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
136. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (overruling Marshall v.
United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 938 (1966)).
137. Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
138. Id.; Lord v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
961 (1965); cf. United States v. Birrell, 243 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
139. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925). When a consent is
given to search an automobile at the defendant's home, the courts employ the rules ap-
plicable to a search of the home. Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954);
Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952); Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263
154 So. 2d 289 (1963).
140. 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
141. See Camp v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 68, 104 P.2d 572 (1940).
142. United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1962).
143. 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
144. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
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senter did not own the car when they conducted the search, and they broke
into a locked case to find the evidence. Thus, Eldridge could have been
distinguished factually. In any event, further litigation in this area is nec-
essary before precise rules can be developed.
CONCLUSION
Evidence which is seized through an invalid third party consent search is
excluded because of the fourth amendment. In theory, there should be
certain minimum requirements based on that amendment as interpreted
and applied by the Supreme Court. However, with the exceptions of
Chapman v. United States45 and Stoner v. California,14 the Supreme
Court has declined to define third party consent law, and those cases
provide almost no indication of what the Supreme Court will eventually
decide the law to be.
Chapman and Stoner clearly hold that absentee landlords and hotel man-
agers may not consent to searches of premises occupied exclusively by a
tenant-defendant. Beyond this the Supreme Court has said only that third
party consent law may not be founded on principles of property and
agency law which do not also consider the elements of reasonableness. With
such vague directions, the lower courts have continued to apply the pos-
session and control test. (California, of course, utilizes the "apparent
authority" doctrine.) These approaches do not necessarily violate the
Supreme Court ruling that the fundamental question is always the reason-
ableness of the search. Some courts have applied the Chapman-Stoner
,approach to factually different cases in which the search was held unrea-
sonable. 47
Clearly further guidance on third party consent law is needed from the
Supreme Court because of disagreement among the courts in their inter-
pretations of the fourth amendment, and because of the large number of
searches which are made pursuant to third party consent. Even within a
single jurisdiction, because a majority of the problems are probably solved
by trial courts, there is need for specific guidance which Chapman and
Stoner have not provided.
The use of these searches is more frequent than indicated by the number
of reported appellate decisions. This does not ncessarily imply that current
third party consent rules are too lenient. After further consideration, the
Supreme Court may decide that an approach similar to that of California
145. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
146. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
147. E.g., State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
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is best, perhaps resulting in an increase of the number of third party con-
sent searches.
When attempts are made to provide definite solutions to third party
consent problems, several questions which are unanswered by the existing
case law must be considered. Heretofore, the courts have been almost
exclusively concerned with the circumstances under which valid third
party consent can be given. Once it is determined that the consent was
valid, little attention has been given to the scope of the search. It is appar-
ently assumed that since the consent validates the search, it may be limited
only by the consenter. 4 ' When a search is made incident to a valid arrest,
the area searched may be limited.'49 Similarly, there are limitations on
searches made with search warrants."' Under third party consent law,
however, the police might return several times over an extended period;
if consent is reasonably obtained each time, the "search" is valid."' Fur-
thermore, there is little indication that the physical area must be limited
in consent searches. 2 Hence, even though most opinions state that the
search was either reasonable or unreasonable, the courts do not actually
question the reasonableness of the search but rather that of the consent.
It is suggested that third party consent cases contain two issues. Courts
could consider not only the circumstances under which the consent was
given but also the reasonableness of the search, once it is determined that
under the usual consent rules the consent is valid. That is, the second
issue would be: in the totality of the circumstances, was the search reason-
able? Though this might be based upon rather vague criteria, it would
allow a court to invalidate a search which, on the whole, seems unreason-
able, even though under the more established consent rules alone, the
evidence would have to be admitted. It should be noted that this kind
of inquiry is not the policy behind the exclusive use doctrine. Analytically,
that doctrine is merely an extension of the general consent rule; that is,
the consenter has no right to possession or control over a part of the premi-
ses or a thing which is subject to another's exclusive use.
Another seldom considered problem in third party consent cases is that
148. Very few cases make such a statement; however, it is implied in many opinions.
See People v. Murillo, 50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
149. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Drayton v. United States, 205
F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953).
150. The fourth amendment limits the search to the place and thing named in the
warrant.
151. People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957).
152. See, e.g., Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965); Holzhey v. United
States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365
(1962).
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the consenter is often ignorant of the circumstances surrounding the request
that he permit a search. He may not realize the gravity of the conse-
quences which might result from his consent. He may be unaware that
a crime has been committed; or he may readily consent to avoid drawing
suspicion toward himself.
Many consentors are not aware of their right to refuse to allow the
search; they may assume that the police are merely being polite. A recent
confession case5 3 requires that defendants be apprised of certain rights be-
fore waiving them, and this may foreshadow similar requirements (such as
disclosure of the right to refuse) before third parties can be asked to con-
sent. 4 Undoubtedly many consenters do not realize that if permission
to search is not given, the police might not be able to obtain a warrant, or
that a search pursuant to a warrant might be more restricted than a con-
sent search.
These factors tend to lead to an inequality of bargaining positions, an
inequality of knowledge of constitutional rights and of the facts giving
rise to the search, between the police and consenting parties. In developing
consent rules, it is necessary to ascertain the extent of this inequality and
the extent that rules narrowing the inequality might restrict the number
of consents given. It would be virtually impossible to eliminate completely
the consenting party's disadvantage. However, by requiring the police to
make certain disclosures, the gap in bargaining positions can be nar-
rowed.' 5 The police could be required to disclose in writing what they are
153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
154. Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLuA.
L. Rav. 130, 148-50 (1967).
155. In some cases, the courts have considered the importance of police disclosures
but did not require them. Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 944 (1965); Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965), remanded on other
grounds, 384 U.S. 312 (1966); Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965); People v. Palmer, 31 Ill. 2d 58, 198 N.E.2d 839
(1964); McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964); Bellam v. State, 233 Md.
368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964). Usually if there is a disclosure it is that the police are look-
ing for a specific piece of property or type of evidence. E.g., People v. Alverez, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 106, 45 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1965); People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 2d 88, 314
P.2d 58 (1957); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 980 (1959). If the third party is told that he has a right to refuse, the court
will consider this as an element of reasonableness. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d
892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965); United States v. Roberts, 179
F. Supp. 478 (D.D.C. 1959); State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966). However, the fact that the third party is
ignorant of his right to refuse will not invalidate an otherwise valid consent. E.g., State
v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965). But see United States v. Roberts,
supra.
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looking for, whether a crime has been committed, and whether there is a
present suspect. Further, the third party could be informed that he can
refuse to allow the search, and that if he consents any evidence found may
be used against the defendant.
All of this information could be contained in a written waiver form
which would have a greater impact upon the consenter than verbal dis-
closures. Written waiver forms are currently in use, and are of utility to
the police in eliminating disputes as to whether consent was given. 50 How-
ever, they do not seem to be required in any jurisdiction. Obviously, a
requirement that consent could only be obtained if the third party signed
a form disclosing certain types of information would decrease the number
of third party consent searches.
Another difficulty is the absence of a pre-search point of view as to the
constitutionality of the search. Of course, even a search with a warrant
can be attacked. ' However, in this situation, there is at least a point of
view-that of the magistrate-from which reasonableness can be tested.
With a search pursuant to a valid arrest, the point of view of the reason-
ably prudent policeman is available to test probable cause to make the
arrest. Arguably California has adopted a similar approach by requiring
that the police, before making the search, reasonably believe that the
third party has sufficient control over the premises to authorize the search.
However, in other jurisdictions, validity rests primarily on the relation-
ship of the third party to the premises, a fact which can readily be deter-
mined by the courts in deciding whether to suppress evidence, but which
may cause difficulties at the time of the search, when fourth amendment
questions must initially be answered to avoid a violation of individual
rights. It could be reasoned that the possession and control test forces the
police to ascertain whether the third party has such a property interest
before searching. However, because a third party on the premises pos-
sesses the requisite property interest in most situations, it is likely that the
police never make the inquiry. Further where the exclusive use doctrine
is recognized, the police would have to make further determinations once
156. If the third party signs a consent waiver form, this will also be considered an
element of reasonableness. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965); Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.
1955); United States v. Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 857 (1965); People v. Harvey, 48 Ill. App. 2d 261, 199 N.E.2d 236 (1964). How-
ever, refusal to sign will not invalidate an oral consent. McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9,
202 A.2d 320 (1963).
157. E.g., United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960); Baysden v. United
States, 271 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1959); Sparks v. State, 39 Ala. App. 517, 104 So. 2d 764
(1958); People v. Sovetsky, 343 Ill. 583, 175 N.E. 844 (1931).
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they have received consent to search the entire premises. In short, it can
be argued that the possession and control test is unworkable if its purpose is
to prevent unconstitutional searches.
California does not necessarily solve the problem by approving searches
when the requisite relationship does not exist if the police have made a
reasonable mistake about the relationship. It is possible that the California
rule encourages the police to learn as little as possible about the third
party's control over the premises searched and the items seized so that
mistakes will appear to be reasonable. Perhaps California could require
the police to make certain inquiries of the consenter before relying on his
consent. This would strengthen the California test, which is based on
the premise that evidence should be excluded only when its seizure results
from police misconduct.
In one third party consent case the court said that consent is the weak-
est basis for supporting a search."' Therefore, if the potential defendant is
available, the police might make the search "more reasonable" by request-
ing his consent rather than that of the third party. If this is so, the pos-
session and control test could be tempered by rules which look to the where-
abouts of the defendant. If he is present or in custody when the search
is conducted, the search could be held unreasonable if the police do not
ask him to consent; a subsequent third party consent could be held invalid
once the defendant refuses. However, such a rule should not be adopted
without caution. One commentator has said that the federal courts will
not allow a defendant to consent if he is in custody, reasoning that such
consent is inherently involuntary." 9 If third party consent were also for-
bidden under such circumstances, no search could be made in a case in
which the defendant is in custody unless a warrant is obtained. Further-
more, the fact that defendant's consent has a more reasonable basis than
that of a third party does not necessarily mean that third party consent is
not reasonable for fourth amendment purposes.
Third party consent law provides an excellent opportunity to re-evaluate
the balancing of police needs against fourth amendment rights. Recently
the tendency has been to strenghten enforcement of fourth amendment
rights and, arguably, law enforcement objectives have suffered. Third party
consent law may not be following this trend. Though some opinions have
stated that decisions are based on whether a third party should be permit-
158. See People v. Gonzalez, 50 Misc. 2d 508, 270 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
159. Lafave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of the True Law . . .Has Not ...
Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 316.
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ted to waive the defendant's rights,16 this approach is not recommended
because it is doubtful that anyone's constitutional rights can be waived by
another. In these cases, the third party waives his right to prevent the
search.1 61 If the defendant also has rights in the premises, perhaps those
rights are being violated; however, the fourth amendment does not guaran-
tee freedom from all searches and seizures, but rather only freedom from un-
reasonable ones. From a police misconduct point of view, assuming that
coercive factors do not exist and that the circumstances surrounding the
search and the legal consequences which will result from the consent are
known to the consenter, the third party consent search appears entirely rea-
sonable; the police have asked for and received the permission of one who
has the right to invite others onto or exclude others from, the premises. Even
from the defendant's point of view, the search is not entirely unreasonable.
The defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of an absolute right
to privacy; he has decided to share the premises with another and could
not realistically expect that his effects would be entirely secure, especially
if they are not subject to the exclusive use doctrine.
Hence, a policy which permits free use of well-regulated third party
consent searches can be supported. It cannot be denied that such a policy
would limit individual rights to some extent. The question is whether
legitimate police objectives are sufficiently furthered by third party consent
searches to make the resulting infringement of these rights reasonable under
the fourth amendment.
160. People v. Lind, 370 Il1. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938); cf. United States v. Sully,
56 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
161. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
980 (1965).
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